IMT Nuremberg Archives

H – 3658

International Court of Justice

H3658 - 0002

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

EVIDENCE DIVISION

Date : 4 August 1948

I certify that Document Number D-490 was introduced into evidence as Exhibit Number GB-138 in the Trial by the International Military Tribunal of Hermann GOERING, et al, which commenced on 20 November 1945, and that the attached photostat is a true and correct copy of the original.

Fred Niebergall

Fred NIEBERGALL
Chief, Document
Control Branch.

H3658 – 0003

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that the annexed document D-490 No. GB-138 is a photostat of an original document submitted in evidence by the British Prosecution under this number. The original document has been withdrawn in accordance with Rule 10 of the International Military Tribunal, and to the best of my knowledge and belief is to be held at the National Archives, Washington D.C.

Paul Joosten

PAUL A. JOOSTEN

General Secretary
International Military Tribunal

Nuremberg, 4 August 1948

H3658 - 0004

Ribbentrop's Russage
10 Sept.

D490

SECRET

Extract from

Testimony of JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, taken at Nuremberg, Germany, on 20 September 1945, 1430 - 1615, by Col Howard A. Brundage, JAGD, OUSCC, and Mr. D.C. Pool, Special Representative of the Secretary of State. Also present: Siegfried Ramler, Interpreter, and Pvt Clair Van Vleck, Court Reporter.

COLONEL BRUNDAGE TO THE WITNESS:

Q Will you state your full name?

A Herr von Ribbentrop.

Q You are the same von Ribbentrop that has testified here before?

A Yes.

Q Today we want to discuss some questions of foreign policy and there is a representative present, from the State Department of the United States, who would like to ask you some questions.

A Yes.

MR. POOL TO THE WITNESS:

Q I had an opportunity, Mr. Ribbentrop, to read the records of the interrogations conducted by Col. Brundage, and I was struck, among other things, by your statement which was made on two or three occasions, I believe, that what you called the Three-Powers Pact was designed to deter the United States from entering the war, since it would confront the United States with a possibility of war in the Atlantic and Pacific at the same time; is that correct?

A Yes; that is correct; that is right.

Q When was the Three-Powers Pact, as you call it, signed?

A I am sorry I couldn't tell you exactly when. (RIBBENTROP)

SECRET

038305

H3658 - 0005

Q Would it be December of 1936?

A No. It was after the French war. It must have been autumn, 1940 or something like that, I think, but I am not quite sure. Was it autumn, or was it December, or was it the winter? I think it must have been autumn, 1940, I think so.

Q That clears up one difficulty which I had.

A No. I think that what you perhaps are thinking of is originally when the Fuehrer first wanted to have good relations with Japan.

Q Yes.

A This was then more from the Weltanschauungs standpoint, and perhaps what you are thinking of is the anti-Comintern pact, which I think was closed, it may have been 1936, I am not quite sure.

Q I think the date is December, 1936.

A But that was more of a Weltanschauungs pact, which was closed against the propaganda of Bolshevism and so on, which was closed, I think, first with Japan, and later Italy joined, and then, of course, later during the war a number of other states joined it, but that was anti-Comintern. That had nothing to do with the United States then.

Q You describe it as Weltanschaulich and at the same time as being anti-Russian.

A Anti-Bolshevik, anti-Communistic, against activities of what we called the Comintern, which was working in Moscow and had branches, secret or open, practically all over the world. Then, you see, especially also in Germany.

H3658 - 0006

Q It is very interesting. Of course, I have been under the impression that it was not only the Weltanschauung, in the manner that you speak of, but was a factor in the balance of power.

A Well, I don't think one can say that. It was really, in the first place, a Weltanschauung matter. At the same time, of course, you know, we had a very strong anti-Bolshevik and anti-Communistic line in Germany. It was quite natural to cooperate with states like Japan who didn't want Communistic activities and so on.

Q Whose idea was that pact? Who originated the idea of that pact?

A Well, I don't really know. How did it come about? The Fuehrer occasionally saw the Japanese. I saw them quite often. We have then an anti-Comintern place in Berlin, an institution whichwas called the anti-Comintern. While out of this, the whole thing more or less originated, it was an idea which more or less came in discussions with the Fuehrer and with me and with the Japanese. We wanted to have good relations with the Japanese. The Fuehrer once told me -- this really dates back as far as '33 -- that he would like to have good relations with Japan, that he believed Japan to be a nation with which one could have good relations and so on. That dated back quite a long way. So this sort of gradually developed and that is the way we came to the anti-Comintern pact.

Q Was Japan the primary thought? Was it not an ally in the rear of Russia? If I may explain, we are all familiar with "Mein Kampf", and the development of Hitler's thought so far as it appears

H3658 - 0007

in publications. It seemed natural, in January of '33, that the Russian question should present difficulties.

A Yes; but when this anti-Comintern pact was closed, so far as I remember it, I don't think that there was any, let us say, special anti-Russian line, I mean politically. It was anti-Russian in the Weltanschauung sense, but there was no political thought of doing anything against Russia at that time. I don't think so.

Q At the time I was in Germany, the Rappalo policy was being followed. You understand what I mean by that?

A Yes.

Q Did this represent a departure from that policy?

A Well, of course, I think one can say, fundamentally, that the National Socialistic doctrine was so anti-Communist -- you perhaps remember the speeches which were made here at Nuremberg in '33, '34, '35, and so on -- that it was, more or less, I should like to say, in the air and, of course, the Japanese also wanted to have a closer contact with Germany at that time.

Q I must speak rather pointedly. You and I were acquainted in Berlin and you have been the Foreign Minister of Germany, experienced in diplomacy. You do not expect me to believe that so important a step was taken simply for reasons of idealogy. I accept your statement in some large part, but it is impossible for me to believe that so important a step in foreign policy could be taken on these grounds

038309

H3658 - 0008

alone. There must have been the thought of considerations, which I describe as balance of power. You can describe them how you will, but you understand what I am talking about.

A That may be so, but there was nothing really, let us say, purely political, which came out of it. You see, it came this way. I remember that I talked to the British Foreign Minister then one day about it, and we were very much anti-Bolshevik and anti-Soviet. As a matter of fact, anti-Comintern, let us say. I remember talking to this English Foreign Minister and telling him, After this pact had been closed, the anti-Comintern pact, that it was perfectly open for Great Britain to join, for instance. I remember that. I should like to say this: it was the idea of the Fuehrer of establishing a general anti-Communistic front, more or less.

Q So far as Great Britain is concerned, there had been an Anglo-Japanese Alliance until 1922?

A Yes.

Q So your point is not very effective there.

A I beg your pardon?

Q Your point is not very effective because Great Britain could join. She had traditional relations with Japan.

A Yes.

Q She had been in an open alliance with Japan until 1922?

A I know that the English then did not like the idea very much. They did not want to take an attitude in the matter. I remember that.

H3658 - 0009

Q Tell me what was the attitude of the German Foreign Office?

A I should like to say this, this pact was, I think, if I remember well, closed then with the Japanese Ambassador and it was signed, I think, by myself, on a particular order of the Fuehrer. The Foreign Office, I don't remember really exactly, but I think they just participated in advising in the matter. As it was a Weltanschauung matter, it was sort of handled more or less a little bit out of the hands of the Foreign Office.

Q Did the Foreign Office know what was going on?

A I beg your pardon?

Q Did the Foreign Office know what was going on?

A Oh yes, they got all the contracts; yes.

Q We agreed that it was signed in December of '36.

A December of '36, was it?

Q Yes, it was signed. At what date do you suppose that the Foreign Office knew that Germany was about to make such a treaty?

A I think they should have known quite a time, I should think so. I don't remember, though, I must say. I know when it was signed, I mean the contracts, they went over to the Foreign Office.

Q After it was signed?

A Yes.

Q But here was a state document, being negotiated in the foreign field?

A Yes; that is right.

H3658 - 0010

Q Was the Foreign Office a participant, or did the Foreign Office know that this was going on?

A I couldn't tell you exactly about that. I know one thing for sure, that it was signed, I think, by myself, on a particular order of the Fuehrer, but I am sure the Fuehrer discussed it with the Foreign Minister von Neurath.

Q You are quite sure?

A Oh, I should think so, yes.

Q What was Germany's earlier policy in the Far East with regards to China, for example?

A Well, there was a policy, of course, of where we had good relations, as far as I remember, with China. There was a military mission there in China, I think with General Chiang Kai Shek, I think, wasn't it?

Q Yes.

A The relations, I think, with China were pretty good but there was nothing particularly on the political field, I don't think. It was just a question, more or less, I think, on the military field of instructing the Chiang Kai Shek army.

Q You don't remember the Japanese complaining because of German officers helping the Chinese forces after 1936?

A That is possible. That may be possible, yes. I don't remember exactly. You mean complained to us?

Q Yes.

A Yes; that is possible. That is quite possible. Yes, it is I think so.

H3658 – 0011

Q My information is that German officers directed the digging of trenches around Shanghai against the Japanese and that a German officer advised the Governor of Shantung, I think, that he should be more obedient to Chiang Kai Shek and that Japan complained on these two points.

A What year was that, do you know?

Q This would be between '36 and '38.

A That is possible. Of course, I wouldn't know very much about it because I was in London then, you see. I was Ambassador in London at that time, but that is quite possible. I remember that complaints had been there. I remember that.

Q The point of my remarks is to ascertain from you whether this alliance with Japan did not mark a very decided break in the continuity of German Policy in the Far East?

A Well, you mean with China?

Q Yes.

A Of course, there is no doubt that it meant a change in policy toward China to a certain extent. Our relations with China were going on, but there was a certain cooling off, I think. Later on, when this Japanese-China war broke out, we withdrew, as far as I remember, our mission there in China, but that was later on, I think. Was that not '38, or something, or '37? When did this war start?

Q Hitler ordered the withdrawal of the German military missions in China in '38, according to my recollection. However, these precise facts are not what I am endeavoring to establish, but I am troubled

H3658 - 0012

about this situation: the anti-Comintern pact marked a very definite change in Germany's relations with Russia. Up to that time, German relations with Russia had been marked by the Rappolo policy and, concurrently, Germany had maintained markedly friendly relations, with China. The anti-Comintern pact reversed both of these important lines of policy. Therefore, I am exceedingly surprised to have you characterize the anti-Comintern pact as almost altogether idealogical and without much political significance.

A One can say this: with the getting into power of the National Socialism, the Rappolo policy, I mean with the antagonism between the Weltauffassungen, would come to an end, which came up in the "Parteitag" in '33 when very hard speeches were made against Bolshevism. So I think one can say that the change of policy toward Russia -- later on, China -- could be marked down with the 3rd of January, 1933, when it started, and the anti-Comintern pact of '36 was a consequence, you see of this fundamental divergency between the Communistic and the National Socialistic doctrine, which I later tried to, in '39, overbridge again and try to get Russia in an entirely new line. But at that time, I think it is not wrong to say, that the fundamental part was the question of world perception and, of course, it is no doubt that having these two Weltauff-assungen standing against each other, that there is a political element in that. There is no doubt about that. So far as that is concerned, there is no doubt that the anti-Comintern pact had a political element of some kind, but more in the way of what was very much in the mind of the Fuehrer at that time -- it is very difficult

(RIBBENTROP)

H3658 - 0013

to explain -- an idea which the Fuehrer always had in mind, for creating a world front against Communistic activities everywhere. That was one of his fundamental ideas, really, which perhaps to a certain extent, also played a role later on in the German-Russian war of '41.

Q I recognize, as I have said already, the validity of that up to a point, but I am trying to bring about a meeting of minds between you and me. I am trying to induce you to discuss these problems in a realistic way. With your experience, you understand what I am trying to get at. It was unnecessary for me to tell you who had been Foreign Minister, about the break in German policy towards Russia and towards China. My purpose in driving these points home is to induce you to speak with me frankly.

A Yes.

Q I am bound to say, with the utmost courtesy, that I am left with the impression, up to this point, that you are not dealing with me frankly.

Q But why? I mean I don't quite see the point. It was a change of policy, to a certain extent, no doubt, but I can only tell you the way the whole thing came about. You see, it came about from the anti-Communistic idea of National Socialism. That is the way it came about. There was at the same time, no doubt, a political element in that, which was anti-Russian. I quite agree with you.

Q That settles that.

A There is no doubt about that. I remember the Fuehrer's saying that he, having received this antagonism from Moscow, that he would like to have good relations, es[illegible] good relations with Japan, and

H3658 - 0014

the anti-Comintern pact was the first step in that direction.

Q Who thought of the name "Anti-Comintern Pact"?

A I have to think. I don't remember exactly, but I think it was one of my collaborators, but I am not quite sure who really started it first. I don't remember exactly.

Q Do you remember von Raumer?

A It is possible that von Raumer did. It originally came from an office which was attached to the Propaganda Ministry, or something, some anti-Comintern office which we had. It is possible that Raumer was the first to mention it. That is quite possible.

Q Wasn't Raumer with you in the so-called Bureau Ribbentrop?

A Yes.

Q Tell us about the Bureau Ribbentrop. Naturally, I am greatly interested in its history and its relation to the foreign office.

A It is possible that Raumer, quite possible that he did, but he got the name from the anti-Comintern, which was an anti-Comintern action we had in Germany.

Q I just offer you this hypothesis: that a political pact was contemplated between Germany and Japan--

A Then?

Q Yes -- that this was intended, but it could hardly be called a non-aggression pact, because the two countries were far apart; and so Raumer had this bright idea of calling it an anti-Comintern pact because the Soviet government had recently declared that the Comintern was not an official organ of the Soviet government. Do not these

H3658 - 0015

remarks of mine stir up some recollections?

A It is quite possible that Baumer said that name first. I think he had some connection with the anti-Comintern, it is possible, the anti-Comintern action, but he didn't create the name because the name was there. The name was there as an action with an office (SIC), I think, which was attached to either the Propaganda Ministry or some other thing. That is where the name came from.

Q You wouldn't say that the name was more or less a false fascade. I say more or less because I recognize some justice in your earlier remarks, but wasn't it a fascade to cover up what was really a plain, everyday balance of power treaty between Germany and Japan?

A Well, cover up, I wouldn't say that.

Q Disguise; if you prefer the term.

A I don't think that is what it was. It wasn't a disguise pact, but there is no doubt that, in general, there was the idea of having good relations with Japan. That is the way I think it came about, that we came to the Weltanschaung pact or the anti-Comintern, but it is quite possible that Baumer mentioned that first. That is quite possible, but I don't think he created it because there was always this anti-Comintern action, which was there. You see, I remember discussing with the Fuehrer later on, that it would be very good and useful, if Great Britain would enter a thing like that. I remember that. But the English didn't want it at that time. One thing is quite right, that it had its political elements, there is no doubt.

(RIBBENTROP)

H3658 - 0016

It is a change-- I wouldn't say a change, but it was a consequence of the change of policy of 1933, you see, which came with the arrival of National Socialism, which then, of course, was anti-Communistic. This was the first step. You know, lateron quite a number of other countries joined it. Italy joined it and a number of others.

Q So with the coming of National Socialism, you had a definite break in Germany's policy toward Russia and towards China; at the same time a very important negotiation was carried through in the foreign field without the participation of the Foreign Office.

A Well, to a certain extent this was handled directly by the Fuehrer and myself, that is right.

Q Tell us about the Bureau Ribbentrop. I don't know whether that was its official title, but you know what I mean.

A That wasn't the official title. It was called that.

Q Did it have an official title?

A I think I have explained before about the Bureau Ribbentrop. It was an office, let us say, a part of the National Socialist Party, which really consisted of myself and, perhaps, I don't know, perhaps a dozen collaborators or something like that, with a number of other people who had, during those years, looked after, so to speak, the semi-official, not official, channels of relationships with various foreign countries. For instance, we specialized, really, on England and France in those years. That is to say, with France, to get good relations with France, and good relations with Great Britain. That was more or less the chief object, I would like to say, of the Bureau

033318

H3658 – 0017

Ribbentrop in those years.

Q But it also occupied itself with the Japanese questions?

A It occupied itself also with Japanese questions, to a certain extent, but I don't think very much. Then to a certain extent with Polish questions, but that was only later, I think; and with, perhaps one or two or three other countries. I wouldn't say it was really formed, but it came about that way. I was a collaborator of the Fuehrer in foreign politics since 1933 and as I wanted to have some place where to sit, that is how it really came about. I got a number of rooms in the Party office of Hess, at that time, Deputy of the Fuehrer, in the Wilhelmstrasse. I got a number of rooms there and I got a number of collaborators. Raumer, which you mentioned, was one of them. From there I made my trips, especially to Paris and London, but they were the chief trips really, I think, where I went in order to try and establish better relations with France and England. You know, of course, that we were in those years very much after and tried to get, the Anglo-German alliance; that was really the main object.

Q How was the Bureau financed?

A So far as I know, I think it was financed by the Party, at first, and by the State; I think by both. First it was by the Party and then I think also by the Finance Ministry, but especially by the Party, I think, so far as I remember.

Q Surely you would know. It was your own office, wasn't it?

A Yes; but first I think it was the Party who paid the funds,

033319

H3658 - 0018

and later on it was the Finance Ministry, I think.

Q Well, in effect, it became official later?

A Well, it had no official position, no. I became official after 1934 when I moved over to the Foreign Office in 1934. I don't know whether you know that. When I was made Disarmament Commissioner, moved over in '34 to the Foreign Office, but the Bureau Ribbentrop as you called it, that remained there and looked after these sort of semi-official relations with Anglo-German fellowship, Committee France-Allemagne.

Q However, they negotiated, or assisted you to negotiate this treaty with Japan?

A That is right.

Q Independently of the Foreign Office, They must have had access to official records. They must have had use of the German secret code.

A Let me see, this was handled with the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. I had, of course, use of the code as Disarmament Commissioner in the Foreign Office, but the Bureau Ribbentrop didn't have any code, not the code of the Foreign Office.

Q But they must have had access to the papers, to the Akten?

A I don't think so. They may have to a certain extent, but I really don't remember. I don't think there were many Akten necessary for these things.

Q Oschima was the Japanese military attache?

A Yes.

Q Who was the German Ambassador in Japan at that time? It was

H3658 - 0019

Durksen, was it not?

A I think so.

Q Durksen succeeded you in London, didn't he?

A Yes.

Q So you knew him well, didn't you?

A No; I can't say I knew him well. I didn't know him very well, but I proposed him to the Fuehrer for London because I thought he was a diplomat of good routine and so on.

Q Do you recall in July, or in the summer of '36, that was in the months preceding the signing --

A July '36.

Q -- of the Comintern treaty, that Durksen came to Berlin on leave from Tokyo and had a talk with you?

A That I don't remember.

Q You don't remember that?

A Did he ever talk with me?

Q Yes; and you told him about the anti-Comintern pact.

A I don't remember that.

Q You don't remember that?

A I am sorry, but I don't remember that. Durksen came to see me?

Q Yes.

A It is possible, of course, that I have forgotten it. Can you perhaps, help my recollections somewhat?

Q I happened to be in Berlin that summer as a tourist and I happened to see Durksen at that time.

H3658 - 0020

A Oh, that was in July, '36, you say?

Q Yes.

A I don't recollect that. And I talked with him about the anti-Comintern?

Q Yes; you told him about it.

A In '36? In July already?

Q Yes.

A Was it possible?

Q He said that Neurath was his superior and he asked your permission to tell Neurath about it and you said "Yes" he could, and that was the first the Foreign Office knew about it.

A I am surprised a little bit because the Fuehrer discussed all these matters, generally, with Herr von Neurath.

Q I wanted to offer that to you for any comment, which you might care to make.

A I am sorry but I don't recollect that. I have forgotten it entirely but, of course, it is quite possible. Did he come to see me at the Foreign Office; do you know?

Q I couldn't tell you that. I wouldn't know that. I simply know that he saw you at that time.

A Surely I told Neurath myself, didn't I?

Q I am asking you.

A I must have told Neurath myself, surely. I must have.

Q You understand my interest in the matter. It is an astounding situation, I repeat.

A But I would ask him. Von Neurath must have known when I in-

formed him. Surely von Neurath must have known quite a long time before it was closed and I am almost certain that I must have told him myself. There always wasn't, perhaps, a 100% agreement between us, but I am sure I told him.

Q I am insistent on the point because we know, not from one person but from numerous persons of the Foreign Office, that this important step in foreign relations was taken without their knowledge.

A It is quite possible that only one or two knew, but I am sure Neurath must have known.

Q You think Neurath knew?

A I should imagine so because the Fuehrer discussed everything with him.

Q Again, Herr von Ribbentrop, you imagine so. It is possible, in a well-ordered state, that the Minister of Foreign Affairs should not know that negotiations of that kind were not going on?

A I am sure he knew. I am sure of it. I don't remember now exactly, when, or how, or if he informed him. I don't really recollect at the moment, but it is quite possible that the Fuehrer then, I don't remember that exactly, did not want too many people to know about it. That is quite possible, because such things he always liked to have not too many people to know about them. It was the same thing, you know, when I made the naval arrangement, I might perhaps tell you, with the English. That was something which I negotiated for the Fuehrer, so to speak, being in the Foreign Office and being under von

H3658 - 0021

H3658 - 0022

Neurath, but the Fuehrer gave me also instructions, I remember, so far as the naval arrangement, for instance, is concerned, he gave me that all direct, and I remember that the Fuehrer, himself, informed von Neurath that he sent me and so on, and, of course, I also went to see Neurath about it. But the arrangement and everything was more or less in London, also directed by myself on particular order by the Fuehrer. This you can only understand because the Fuehrer had a tremendous antagonism or dislike, or he always stood under the impression, which I may perhaps say I never got over that myself until the end, even when I had the Foreign Ministry since 1938, I never could do away with the distrust of the Fuehrer with everything which had to do with the distrust of the Fuehrer with everywhich had to do with the Foreign office. There were many, many things which the Fuehrer discussed with me, many, many things, which he, particularly, every time told me that I was not to tell a soul in the Foreign office. This was a particular dislike of the Fuehrer, the belief of the Fuehrer that the people in the Foreign office would not keep secrets and could not keep secrets, that these things would come to the ears of foreign diplomats and that sort of thing. It was almost a mania of the Fuehrer, which went through all along. With Neurath it was the same thing and with me it was the same thing.

So when I closed the naval arrangement, I got all the instructions, not from von Neurath, but I got them from the Fuehrer, and I got all the detailed instructions all from the Admiralty, from Raeder, and so, direct. I remember that very well and the Fuehrer wanted me to

H3658 - 0023

treat it that way and not to discuss it with all the other officials of the Foreign Office. Of course, Neurath was informed, but I don't think even the Secretary of State knew. When the naval arrangement was closed, it was a great surprise to most people of the Foreign Office. I remember that.

Q I am sure that what you say is correct. It, of course, is other information, but I come back to my point. I assure you, with the utmost kindness, that I do not think that you discussed with me frankly the question of the Japanese pact in its bearing on relations with Russia and China. I said that we could use this opportunity, if I may say so, as two fellow-craftsmen of the past, who understand each other more clearly.

A Yes, but may I ask in what sense do you mean? Do you mean that this pact means a change of policy?

Q Yes; I have already said that.

A There is no doubt that that is what it means. It meant, to a certain extent, a change in policy; there is no doubt.

Q To a certain extent? It was practically a right-angle change of policy with regard to two countries, was it not, with regard to Russia and with regard to China?

A With no doubt in regard to Russia. With regard to China, that was something that came up very much later, wasn't it? I mean because the Chinese war hadn't in no way broken out and I think our relations with China, so far as I do remember it, were kept on a good basis.

Q They were on a good basis with the Foreign Office, one branch of the German government, while another branch of the German government was carrying on negotiations and consummating an alliance with Japan. It is quite true that the good relations were kept going with China.

A I don't hesitate one moment to say that there is no doubt that it was a change of policy, for instance, toward Russia and so on, but, you see, the policy was changed again later, you see, with Russia in '39. We changed it again the other way, you see, didn't we?

Q Yes; that is interesting. Are you willing to tell me the inside of that story? Was that a real, a sincerely intended and permanent pact with Russia?

A Certainly.

Q Or was it a convenience of the moment?

A Absolutely, it was 100% on my part and I am also sure, at the moment it was closed, on the part of the Fuehrer. That was absolutely impression.

Q Could a man of Hitler's age, or at that time of life, is it possible for any individual to change his attitude in so abrupt a manner?

A Well, I very often thought about that and I think I have said it before, and I think I mentioned it when we talked about Russia the other day, I don't remember exactly now: I don't know what part the Weltanschauung played in the decision of the Fuehrer then in '41, what

H3658 - 0024

SECRET

this question played when the interruption or the break with Russia came. I couldn't really tell you that, but when this pact with Russia was closed in '39, when I went to Moscow, it was my impression that the Fuehrer was absolutely sincere in wanting to establish a lasting relation between these two countries, and it certainly was mine. I remember when I came back from the second time I was in Moscow, I told the Fuehrer something which is perhaps queer to you, that after having talked to some of these people, it was as if one had been talking to National Socialistic Party members. I remember making that expression. I thought we could overbridge then this gulf between the two Weltauffassungen. I wanted that absolutely, sincerely, I can assure you, and I have written a long letter to Stalin one day about this during '39, or during '40 I think. I said I hoped we could overbridge that and find an adjustment there also in the political field between the two countries.

Q What happened then prior to June 22, 1941? There was again a complete reversal?

A Well, yes, that is, of course, a long story. The essence really is this: that the Fuehrer had the impression that the Russians were showing a great tendency of moving towards the West. He got the first impression during the Franco-German war, when they overnight moved into Bessarabia and Bukovina. That was the first impression he got. Also, another impression had been the moving into the Baltic. That was the general impression which he had, and then, of course, came

SECRET

H3658 - 0025

H3658 - 0026

SECRET

the development of the military field.

Q Those impressions arose already in '39?

A No; this was in '40.

Q This was in '40?

A After the French war; not in '39, no.

Q In '40?

A Yes; it was in '40.

Q Yes.

A It must have been after the French war. What I told you now was during the end of the French war and then came, of course, during the French war, not the impression, but the very definite fact of the Russians concentrating, of course, their military display all abng their western frontiers. I remember, for instance, that there were great concentrations in Lithuania and also along the Polish frontier and so on; also great concentrations in, I think, Bessarabia. The second point was on the military field. The third point I would like to mention, is the impression which the Fuehrer had, when the Communistic propaganda started again in Germany, in German factories. He got the reports about that. I remember one day he was very anxious about that and, further more, there came reports which showed for the first time to the Fuehrer the tremendous development in the Russian war potential. And also on the Weltauffassungen sector, I can't really tell you exactly, but I know also this point has played a role. It must have played a role with the Fuehrer, together with this Communistic propaganda, which was shown in Germany again, which made him have a tendency very much against Russia after the French war. I know, for instance, that

H3658 - 0027

he showed in those months a most decided tendency of great friendship towards Finland, I remember that, in those months which, of course, irritated the Russians quite a bit at that time, which showed also later on during the Molotoff visit. Then, of course, later on, came one or two other questions on the military side, I would like to say. Then the later developments in '41, politically, when the Russians made this pact with the Simovich putsch government of Belgrade. That is one thing I never really got the definite facts about, but the Fuehrer also stood under the impression, and he repeatedly talked to me about this, that had been most decided, more than feelers, but a most decided approach--I think it was together with the visit of Sir Stafford Cripps, or something like that--between the English and the Russians. I mean that was, more or less, the large outline of the whole development.

Q I am struck by the main seq ence of events; first, in 1936, the break from the Rappolo policy, which had governed German policy since 1922; then in 1939, a bond of friendship and cooperation, which you said you felt to be sincere and eternal; then suddenly within a very short time another about-face. I point out to you, simply, how difficult it is to accept the explanation that you were acting sincerely in 1939.

A I can only say this: that I was sorry for this development, but I must say that the military reasons, which the Fuehrer gave, were very important and, after all, the whole developments later on during the war has shown in that one point, of course, the Fuehrer had been right,

H3658 - 0028
038330

that there was a huge development of power which has been created.

Q That is, his decision in June, '41, his decision prior to the attack of June, '41, rested on military considerations?

A Very much so.

Q That is what you have just said.

A Very much so, I am sure, very much so.

Q I have an inquiry from one of the gentlemen, which relates to the chapter that we are just concluding, so I will put it to you. How long had the German-Soviet negotiations been going on prior to August '39.

A Not very long.

Q What did Germany offer Russia as a basis of negotiations?

A I think the first feelers were, so far as I remember, along the economic line. Of course, we had economic relations with them for quite a while already. I think I proposed to the Fuehrer, first, you see, to come to this adjustment with Russia and the Fuehrer, first, was not very much inclined.

Q When would that be?

A That would have been, perhaps, a few months before, but then when the Fuehrer consented, I think the whole negotiations only took a number of weeks, I think, before I was sent to Moscow, I should say, perhaps three or four or five or six weeks. I don't remember exactly. It was something like that, not very much more.

Q What were you able to offer the Russians as a basis of negotiations?

H3658 - 0029

A Well, you see, I was sent there to create, if possible, a nonaggression pact with them. The Fuehrer told me that I should discuss the German-Russian relations in general with them and try to find an adjustment of policy, especially so that the antagonism which had been going on, propaganda, and political antagonism, should be done away with, and that we should, if possible, come to a non-aggression pact. I had been asked once or twice during these interrogations about the details of what we discussed with the Russians and I have always answered that I did not find myself en-titled, really, to state much upon that. The Russians so far having not spoken on them--

Q I certainly will not press you on that point.

A I mean it is just a matter of international courtesy that I haven't said that, you see.

Q I won't press you on that.

A Along a large line, I can say, that it was trying to adjust the Russian point of view to the German point of view on the large fields of interest which we followed, so that we would not clash. There was one point I can tell you that, of course, was discussed: there was the Polish problem at that time and the possibility -- because our relations had become very tense -- things with Poland might not run well. This also, of course, has been discussed.

Q Beck was considered pro-German? He followed the Pilsudski tradition?

A I think a great misfortune for this whole development was when Marshal Pilsudski died.

H3658 - 0030

Q Did Hitler ever feel that he could have worked out with Pilsudski a solution of German-Polish problems?

A Yes.

Q The Corridor and Danzig?

A I think so. We all hoped for it and thought so. There was somebody, not a political man, who said something which was quite true. While Pilsudski was there I proposed to the Fuehrer in '33 to come to some arrangements with Poland. We made some non-aggression pact with Poland in '33 and it was only due to, I think, to Marshal Pilsudski and the Fuehrer that it was done. We had great hopes that some day the most important problems, like the connection to East Prussia and the Danzig problem, in some way could be solved with Pilsudski, then he died. Somebody said at that time after he died, that the whole political life stood under the dictatorship of the dead, which was rather, I think, a just word said at that moment because while Pilsudski had the life spirit of creating a doing things, his successor and all the other people, also Beck, the moment Pilsudski was dead, they did not move from a rigid point which they had. They never moved from that point.

Q They did not carry on the Pilsudski tradition then in a creative way?

A No. That is what I wanted to say. I am sure that with Pilsudski living we would not have come to the war in 1939. I am sure of it. I am certain of it. Some decision would have been found because we treated with the Polish quite a number of months, but they

H3658 - 0031

never moved one step. I think Pilsudski would have helped.

Q You were Foreign Minister during what years?

A From 1938.

Q When did you go to London? I have forgotten that exactly.

A I was nominated, I think, in the summer of '36.

Q It was when you were Foreign Minister, was it not, that von Papen was called back from Austria as Ambassador? That was done by you, was it not?

A I don't quite remember. I had forgotten that the other day. I was asked here about the Austrian question. When I was asked about this Austrian question here, I had forgotten one or two facts, but I have thought about it in the meantime and it is quite natural that I had forgotten it, because the whole Austrian question in the first weeks after I took the Foreign Office was practically entirely handled by the Fuehrer himself.

Q Was it he or you who called von Papen back from Vienna?

A Was he called back? Let me see now. I had forgotten the other day that when Schuschnigg visited the Fuehrer at the Berghof, I think it must have been in March, '38, that von Papen was with him. I had forgotten that; but I was told that Papen was with him. If he was with him then, he must have been there to the end, wasn't he? I mean until the occupation.

Q No; von Papen was called home before the German troops marched in.

A Oh, before.

H3658 - 0032

Q It was not you who called him back?

A No; I don't think so. It was the Fuehrer then. Let me see. Was that in March?

Q I can't give you the exact month.

A It is clear that a gentleman told me that Schuschnigg was at the Berghof, and he said that von Papen was there at the Berghof, which I had forgotten, I must say. Then I went from there almost directly to London to say goodbye to my friends in London, and while I was in London the whole Austrian thing started. It must have been a very few days after Schuschnigg was there, so Papen should have been recalled within a few days of that? Is that possible? I don't remember that.

Q You would know. You must know.

A I don't remember that.

Q You don't remember that?

A That he should have been recalled then just a day or two before the troops were moving in; is that right?

Q You have no recollection of recalling him, in your capacity as Foreign Minister, or the motivation?

A I don't really remember, but if you can perhaps give me a hint, I can perhaps recollect my memory, but I think that after this Schuschnigg visit -- do you know the date of the Schuschnigg visit, perhaps?

Q No.

A If you knew the date of the Schuschnigg visit, and the march into Austria of the troops, then we could check it up.

Q Surely, as Foreign Minister, if you had taken such a decision

H3658 - 0033

you must remember it. It must be that someone else took the decision.

A You see, the first weeks, I must tell you quite frankly, I knew very little about the Austrian question, so that the other day I had forgotten, as a matter of fact, that there had been, between the Fuehrer and Schuschnigg, documents signed and I recollect now these points, I think there were four or five points that were in there. All that was absolutely handled by the Fuehrer himself. We only got these points some weeks later. I don't think that I saw them in the Berghof. I don't remember. If von Papen was recalled, if he was at the Berghof, within these few days, in the meantime it may be that I was on my way to London and the Fuehrer recalled him while I was on my way to London. I don't remember that exactly, I am sorry, but one can easily find that. One can ask von Papen. He will know exactly.

Q He wouldn't know what your motivation was.

A I don't really know. I must think about it.

Q The second line of inquiry, which I should like to pursue, relates to your repeated assertions that an alliance with England was perhaps No. 1 in your list of targets. You made that remark?

A Yes.

Q Did you propose yourself, to Hitler, to go to London?

A Yes.

Q Or maybe I state that indelicately?

A I will tell you exactly the way it was. The Fuehrer had invited me to Bayreuth, to the Wagner Festivals there. I remember that I came to the Villa Wanfreid of Frau Wagner and in the meantime von

SECRET

Hirsch had died in London some weeks before, I think, and the Fuehrer told me that he had already talked with von Neurath and that he wanted me to become Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs with Neurath.

Q Staatssecretary?

A Staatssecretary.

Q No. 2 in the Foreign Office?

A Yes. He had already told Neurath that he should make the document, which he wanted to sign, and he had agreed with Neurath upon that. Then he came to talk about London and whom to send there and I said to the Fuehrer I would like, if he would think it over, to have him send me, instead of making me Staatssecretary, to send me over to London. Of course, you know in '35 we tried to get Baldwin and the Fuehrer to meet and it didn't go through. The Fuehrer was to some extent already inclined to thinking that the alliance with Great Britain would not go. So I told the Fuehrer I thought it would be well worth while, my going over to London and trying to find out definitely whether it wasn't possible, perhaps, after all, to get this alliance. In the meantime we had quite a number of friends over there. There was King Edward there, who was considered quite friendly toward Germany, and so on. And the Fuehrer quite agreed. So far as I remember, I think I thought it over a day or so. Then I went to the Fuehrer and said, "I have thought it over and I would ask if you agree not to make me Staatssecretary, but send me over to London". And then

SECRET

H3658 - 0034

H3658 - 0035

he said "All right". That is the way it was done.

Q This is serious business, Herr von Ribbentrop, so you will excuse me if I now make a point which is perhaps a little indelicate, but you recognize, do you not, that your Ambassadorship in London was not successful?

A Well, I will tell you, when I was made Ambassador, the British press and everybody, knowing that I had made the naval arrangement with the British Admiralty or the British Foreign Office in '35, I was very pleased to see how the press welcomed me, how everybody welcomed my arrival in '36. Now, why my Ambassadorship was not successful, I think this is easily explained. The one reason, of course, was that we had at the time this very unfortunate non-intervention committee of Spain, I don't know whether you remember that, which was a very unfortunate thing because I was at the same time Ambassador with the British, or with the Court of St. James, and at the same time I had to follow up instructions of my government in the non-intervention committee, which was a sort of a League of Nations, having, more or less, replaced the League of Nations in London, because all sorts of international things were discussed, like Spain. The English at that time very often taking a stand with France, with Russia, and with the Red part of Spain, and against Franco; the Fuehrer, the Italians, taking always a stand with Franco. I had, of course, very often to take a position against the British, which was most unfortunate and which, during my whole stay in London, interrupted very much my real work,

H3658 – 0036

038338

which I was after, trying to establish good relations with Great Britain. That was very unfortunate.

Q Was it your idea, or were you instructed from Berlin, to make the Nazi salute when you were presented?

A No; I was not instructed.

Q You were not instructed. That was your own idea?

A Well, I can say that perhaps I may have been at fault in doing it. At any rate, it was considered only to be an honor to the British soverign, nothing else, of course. I may say that perhaps it was not, in the diplomatic field, the right thing to do. I quite agree. Perhaps I might have omitted it, but at the same time it was considered only to be an honor. I may say this: In spite of what some people have said, the Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps came to me a few days later and said, of course, that the King considered it as nothing but an honor to him. He was very nice about it and he only wondered if some change was made, he would like to know about it.

Q I do not want to press small things, or to be too personal, but the large point which I am trying to make is the incongruity between your repeated assertions that an understanding with Great Britain lay very close to your heart, and to your mind, and the conduct of your embassy in London, which was not successful.

A I think I can answer you that very easily, you see. After all, this desire of coming to a close contact and alliance with Great Britain was very earnest. I spent ten years of my life in this and I think, in spite of the war and everything, there will be dozens of Englishmen

H3658 - 0037

who will confirm that. I have spent day and night of ten years to do that. Why it did not come off, goes to factors which were stronger than myself, I can assure you. I don't want to be too long, but, in short, I think one can say this: That when I was made Ambassador in London, I remember in '36, it was during the Olympic Games, and a very influential Englishman came to the Olympic Games, I don't remember, but I think it was even on my invitation, but I don't quite remember, I think so. It was Lord Vansittart. I had a long discussion with him in the evening at my house and the next day we had lunch together alone. I had a very long discussion with him for many hours. I quite remember that. I was trying to induce him, win him over to come to this Anglo-German arrangement. He didn't move. It was like speaking against the wall. He didn't move at all. The Fuehrer had a talk with him, I think, already in 1936. There was a very strong tendency of very important Englishmen who already then took in their internal policy, if not outwardly, a very firm stand against Germany, thinking that one day this National Socialistic Germany would get too strong. I think that is the answer why I didn't have success in London.

Q Then the Fuehrer asked you to come back to Berlin, as Foreign Minister, and you proposed Durksen, I think, as your successor in London? You said so.

A Yes.

Q You said so a little while ago.

A Yes.

Q Why did you select Durksen?

H3658 - 0038

038340

A I wanted to have a diplomat of routine, a quiet, dignified diplomat. That is really the reason I wanted him in London. That was the only reason.

Q Had his work in Japan been good as Ambassador; had it left a good impression?

A I wouldn't say that it was bad, I don't think.

Q What about the quality of his reports? Were they good sense and dependable?

A From Japan?

Q Yes.

A I don't remember anything, I mean I don't really remember. May I think about that? May I make a point of it?

Q They couldn't have been very bad or you wouldn't have chosen him for London; that is very clear.

A What?

Q They couldn't have been very bad.

A No; I don't think so.

Q Or you wouldn't have chosen him for London. So perhaps it is an unnecessary question.

A No; I don't think so.

Q Do you recall the tenor of his reports from London?

A Well, I may perhaps think of that. The reports of London and --

Q Surely in the case of London, relations with England being your first pre-occupation, you must remember in this critical time, the general tenor of Durksen's reports. Did he believe, for example,

H3658 - 0039

that the British would fight if it came to a show-down in Poland?

A I couldn't tell you that at the moment. I certainly was of this opinion, but I couldn't tell you at the moment. I must think about it.

Q Let me remark, I find it very strange that this matter, which is on your own assertion, of capital importance, your very first consideration; here is a man whom you chose to go to London --

A I would imagine that his reports would have been in that line. I don't remember that at the moment. I will tell you this: I was personally, from the moment the British guarantee was given to Poland, convinced myself. Of course, what Durkaen's reports were before, I couldn't really tell you at the moment.

Q Put your mind, please, on August '39, as the crisis approached. Do you recall when Durksen came back from London to Berlin?

A No, I don't remember, but I suppose I was probably at the front at that moment with the Fuehrer, I suppose. I don't know whether he came back from Switzerland or what. I don't remember now.

Q You don't know?

A No; I don't recall it, no.

Q He came back, I believe, the 18th of August, directly to Berlin.

A The 18th of August?

Q Yes, or approximately. I may be a day or two off. He was not in London?

A Oh, he was not in London.

H3658 - 0040

038342

Q He was not in London when war was declared?

A Let me see. That is quite possible.

Q He returned to Berlin?

A It may be also that I don't recall his reports, that this is the reason I don't recall his reports at that time, you see.

Q I am speaking of his reports over a period of sixteen months.

A Oh, yes.

Q He was in England for sixteen months altogether?

A Yes, but I mean probably that explains why I don't recall his reports in this important period, you see.

Q What explains it?

A This important period of August.

Q No; I am asking about his reports over a period of sixteen months, during his own embassy in London. He came back to Berlin on the 18th of August, or about that time, and he asked for an interview with Hitler and, naturally, for an interview with you, since you were the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

A Yes.

Q According to my information, you did not receive him?

A I don't remember now.

Q What situation could be more dramatic? Here is a Foreign Minister, who has chosen a particular man to be Ambassador in a country with which war threatens, and war actually broke out very soon. He returns from his post approximately two weeks before the outbreak of war; asks to see the Foreign Minister, and the Foreign Minister is too

H3658 - 0041

busy to see him.

A I don't remember that.

Q You don't remember that?

A No. I didn't see him?

Q Yes.

A I don't remember, no. Wasn't he ill?

Q No; he was in perfectly good health.

A I don't remember that exactly.

Q Surely, you recognize that to be a very extraordinary situation. You appreciate the drama of it?

A I assure you -- this was the situation you are talking about, was it?

Q Yes. I will put it to you another way, Herr von Ribbentrop. If you had received him, surely you could not have forgotten an interview under those circumstances?

A Well, I wonder -- let me see, on the 18th -- it is very difficult now to recollect the exact dates. He came back on the 18th, you say, of August?

Q Yes. I may be one or two days off, but war broke out on the 1st of September, as I recall, so let us say a fortnight before that, a little less than a fortnight. Surely you must remember those days with great clarity?

A If I hadn't seen him, I don't remember why. You are quite sure that I didn't see him? I don't know.

Q Your question is in turn astounding. How could a Foreign Minister fail to remember whether he had seen an Ambassador under those

H3658 - 0042

038344

circumstances; his own Ambassador returning from the capitol?

A What was the circumstances on the 18th?

Q Surely, you remember them, Herr von Ribbentrop. This was within two weeks of the outbreak of war.

A Yes, but there was no tense situation. There was, of course, with Poland. The situation had been tense and perhaps was still, but there was no such tense situation with England.

Q It was not tense within two weeks of the outbreak of war?

A I don't remember whether I saw him. I must think about that. I don't know. The 18th of August, you say that was? That surprises me.

Q If the 18th of August troubles you, say the last two weeks of August. It is all the same whether it was one day or the other.

A I wonder whether the circumstances weren't different. Wasn't he there on an illness or something? Hadn't he been away from London for quite a time already?

Q He came to Berlin and asked to see the Fuehrer and he asked to see you. He was not received even by you, although he repeatedly sent word to your secretaries, that he sat in Berlin, in perfectly good health, in the hopes of seeing you and finding it utterly incredible that you should not receive him.

A He surely saw the Secretary of State, didn't he?

Q That is not the question. I want to know whether he saw you. My information is that he did not and you cannot remember. The mere fact that you cannot remember must be very striking to you, isn't it?

A I don't remember that, no. I must think about it. I must think about it. The Fuehrer didn't think much of Durksen, so far as I

H3658 - 0043

033345

remember.

Q He didn't think much of him?

A Not very much, no, but I say I don't remember now. I can't tell you at the moment.

Q You recognize how strange it is that you can't tell me?

A I am certain if he had been there, and I couldn't have seen him, if the situation was that way, he had just come over from London, wanting to see me, I mean if I couldn't see him, perhaps I wasn't in Berlin. I don't remember now.

Q That would interpose no barrier. Germany is not a large country.

A It is sometimes difficult, you see. I don't know where I was. Possibly I told him to see the Secretary of State and make a report about that. That is possible, but I don't remember at the moment.

Q The matter interests me very much because of your insistence in other interrogations that you and the Fuehrer endeavored until the very last moment to come to some understanding with England.

A We certainly did.

Q Then I speak to you quite frankly, because this is an important matter. I just cannot believe that when you did not take the opportunity to talk with your own ambassador, whom you had selected, when he returned from the capitol, again, Herr von Ribbentrop, I come to the unpleasant and inescapable conclusion that you are not being frank with me.

H3658 - 0044

A Oh, yes, absolutely frank. No, that is not right, but you can only understand it by this way: that I can assure you that in the whole discussion with England, in all these events, the name Durksen, and the attitude of Durksen, never has played any role. This again comes very much out of the attitude of the Fuehrer towards diplomats, old diplomats, and embassies and so on. The Fuehrer was so much against most of these ambassadors, and so on, that he hardly ever saw them at all. I couldn't even induce him to see any of them. So it is perhaps understandable in that way. I don't remember at the moment one instance where the reports of Durksen in the sixteen months, where the name of Durksen or his opinions or his views played a role, I must say, in all the Fuehrer's decisions which he made during all that time.

Q I am not interested in the Fuehrer at this moment.

A Also myself.

Q I am interested in your views.

A Also of myself.

Q You were the man who selected him to go to London and had kept him there. At a moment when you were endeavoring, according to your statement, in every way to avoid war, you failed to talk to the man who was presumably best informed?

A I must say quite frankly, in my perception, so far as I remember, we never considered Durksen as a man who had, let us say, my particular confidence or the Fuehrer's particular confidence, never as such. Everybody can tell you that he was a quiet, routine diplomat we had sent there, but he was not a man, I don't think, during the sixteen months, who was ever called to give his views or anything of

H3658 - 0045

that sort. These things were generally done.

Q As a matter of fact, he was recalled during that time on two or three occasions, but in any case, if you send such a man to London at that time, it does not support your contention that you were seriously interested in working out an arrangement with Great Britain.

A We certainly did.

Q Again, either way you put it, it destroys your contention that you wished, at almost any cost, to make an adjustment with England.

A During the last fortnight we still did, I mean during the last fortnight, up until the war broke out, we did in the last week very much. This was also done, not through Durksen, for instance, this was done then through Henderson. For instance, Henderson then went to London, but Durksen played no role in these questions.

Q You made a very poor choice of Ambassador in a critical situation. Either way, you were guilty of dereliction.

A When we sent Durksen there, I remember we considered for a long time who to send. Then we came to Durksen as a quiet and routine ambassador, who would look after matters as well as he could. That was because we had nobody else. That was more or less the idea then.

Q You were speaking a moment ago of your efforts in the last week, and I think I remember reading in your previous testimony that you had in mind that England needed to return -- Hitler had in mind, and you too -- only one or two colonies for raw material purposes.

A We would have liked to have had that.

Q What did Chamberlain offer in 1938 in the adjustment of the

H3658 - 0046

038348

colonial question? Chamberlain offered an adjustment of the colonial question in 1938.

A In what year do you mean? 1930?

Q 1938. You had returned from London.

A Well, the only thing I do remember was what was once discussed, that the English did not want to give any colonies back. It was the idea of some combine of raw materials or something like that. Somewhere in Africa, in some way a combine of excess raw materials, more or less on the economic field, but there was no colonies offered, so far as I remember.

Q You don't remember then, that when Durkson came from Japan, on his way to London to take your post, that he was received by you and Hitler and reference was made to this offer of Chamberlain's and Hitler said that he would not answer it and that Durkson said that this was startling to him, since it seemed very rude not even to answer such a request.

A That is not right. In the first place, Hitler would never say that. He just wouldn't answer a thing. He would never say that. Secondly, it can't be right because I am pretty clear in my recollection, there was never a colony offered, never, never.

Q Never?

A No, never. Then it would have to be without my knowledge when I was not Foreign Minister yet, but when I was Foreign Minister, surely not. When Henderson came, or during the visit of the British statesmen, they offered in the old German colonies, some collateral

H3658 - 0047

038349

access to the raw materials or something of that sort, but nothing political or nothing teritorial, of that I am sure. That cannot be right. I would remember that because it would be so important.

Q Mr. von Ribbentrop, I don't know that I shall see you again. I am here today. I remember seeing you before in Berlin. I don't want to take advantage of my position, but I do feel that, in view of the seriousness of this situation, I do not have the feeling that you are being frank in your relation of these events.

A What do you have reference to?

Q I have already pointed out to you the points as we have gone along. I recommend to you that you think it over and if you would like to discuss these matters with me again, in a less defensive spirit, shall we say --

A I will answer you.

Q -- I am endeavoring to be as courteous as possible -- it can possibly be arranged with Col. Brundage's approval, but this record this afternoon, Herr von Ribbentrop, doesn't do you credit. You think it over.

A What question would you like answered frankly? I might tell you. What question, for instance? About the colonies, you mean?

Q No; did you answer me frankly at the beginning of the Comintern pact? Do you feel that you did?

A I mean didn't I tell you it was a pact which was based on Weltanschauung? No doubt that played a great role.

H3658 - 0048

038350

SECRET

Q Yes; you can underscore that word. It was based on that Weltanschauung.

A I told you no doubt it had a political meaning and it was the beginning of a change of German policy, no doubt. As a matter of fact, it was a continuance of the change of policy which was really there on the 3rd of January, 1933 against Russia, and later on against China too. There is no doubt about that. I quite agree with that.

Q That will be all.

APPROVED:

INTERROGATOR

Siegfried Raub

INTERPRETER

Claire Van Vleck

COURT REPORTER

H3658-0048A

D-490

D 490

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

H-3658

U.S.A. EXHIBIT

No. 138

038304

Filed June 8, 1946

GB Exhibit 138

H3658 - 0049

45

H3658-0050

45 pages